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 Experimental Economics: Induced
 Value Theory
 By VERNON L. SMITH '
 It is the premise of this paper that the
 study of the decision behavior of suitably
 motivated individuals and groups in lab-
 oratory or other socially isolated settings
 such as hospitals (R. Battalio, J. Kagel,
 et al., 1973) has important and significant
 application to the development and veri-
 fication of theories of the economic system
 at large. There are two reasons for this.
 1. The results of laboratory studies can
 serve as a rigorous empirical pretest of
 economic theory prior to the use of field
 data tests. The state of economic hypothe-
 sis testing, as it is sometimes done, can be
 described roughly as follows: based on
 casual observation of an economic process
 and the self-interest postulate, one de-
 velops a model, which is then tested with
 the only body of field data that exists. The
 results of the test turn out to be ambiguous
 or call for improvements, and one is
 tempted to now modify the model in ways
 suggested by the data "to improve the
 fit." Any test of significance now becomes
 hopelessly confused if one attempts to
 apply it to the same data. Where it is pos-
 sible and feasible, as in the study of price
 formation, the data from controlled experi-
 ments can be used to test hypotheses
 stemming from prescientific casual ob-
 servations of a particular phenomenon.
 The fact that one can always run a new
 experiment means that it is never tauto-
 logical to modify the model in ways sug-
 gested by the results of the last experiment.
 Since economic theories always deal with
 certain alleged behavioral tendencies in
 isolation, the experimental laboratory is
 uniquely well suited for testing the validity
 of such theories. It provides an excep-
 tionally rigorous discipline of our ability to
 model elementary situations whether or
 not field data can be regarded ultimately
 as having been generated by such elemen-
 tary models.
 2. The results of experiments can be di-
 rectly relevant to the study and interpre-
 tation of field data. Other so-called nonex-
 perimental sciences such as meteorology
 and astronomy have depended crucially
 for their development on (a) small-scale
 laboratory experiments in the physics of
 mass motion, thermodynamics, and nu-
 clear reactions; and (b) the postulate that
 such microphysical experimental results
 apply, with suitable modifications, to the
 study of the weather, the planets and the
 stars. This parallelism, "As far as we can
 tell, the same physical laws prevail every-
 where" (Harlow Shapley 1964, p. 43), also
 has application to the study of social
 economy. Laboratory experience suggests
 that all of the characteristics of "real
 world" behavior that we consider to be of
 primitive importance-such as self-interest
 motivation, interdependent tastes, risk
 aversion, subjective transactions cost (time
 is consumed), costly information (it takes
 time to acquire and process information),
 and so on-arise naturally, indeed inevit-
 ably, in experimental settings. Anyone
 who had begun the study of economics in
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 the laboratory without these concepts
 would soon find himself inventing them.
 Furthermore, the process of experimental
 design forces one to articulate rules and
 procedures, the collection of which forms
 an institution, organization, or "body of
 law" with striking "real world" parallels
 (cf. Martin Shubik 1974). The laboratory
 becomes a place where real people earn
 real money for making real decisions about
 abstract claims that are just as "real" as a
 share of General Motors.
 I. The Theory of Induced Valuation
 Control is the essence of experimental
 methodology, and in experimental ex-
 change studies it is important that one be
 able to state that, as between two experi-
 ments, individual values (e.g., demand or
 supply) either do or do not differ in a spe-
 cified way. Such control can be achieved
 by using a reward structure to induce pre-
 scribed monetary value on actions. The
 concept of induced valuation (Smith 1973)
 depends upon the postulate of non-
 satiation:
 Given a costless choice between two
 alternatives, identical except that the first
 yields more of the reward medium (usu-
 allv currency) than the second, the first
 will always be chosen (preferred) over
 the second, by an autonomous individual,
 i.e., utility is a monotone increasing func-
 tion of the monetary reward, U(M), U'
 > 0. [pp. 22-231
 This postulate applies to experiments de-
 signed to test price theory propositions
 conditional upon known valuations. Sepa-
 rate experiments can be designed to test
 propositions in preference theory.
 Example 1. In the experimental study of
 competitive equilibria in isolated markets
 it is necessary to induce known (to the ex-
 perimenter) supply or demand on individual
 subjects. Let subject buyers i= 1, 2, . .. , n
 each be given a table listing increasing con-
 cave total receipts Ri(qj) representing the
 currency redemption or "resale" value of
 qi units acquired by subject i in an experi-
 mental market. The instructions state that
 if subject i acquires qi units at prices p;,
 p . . . pi, he will receive cash earnings
 of Ri(qi) -Ekqi1 pk. Neoclassical demand
 is defined as the quantity that would be
 purchased as a function of a given hypo-
 thetical price p. By this definition, if for a
 fixed p a subject purchases qi units, he
 earns Ri(qi)-pqi. If his utility for money
 is Ui(Mi) he will wish to max,i U [Ri(qi)
 -pqi]. We have an interior maximum if
 and only if
 (R! -p)U! =0, U' >0, or qi=Ri'(- )(p),
 for the class of functions Ui, Ri such that
 (RI -p)2U'+ U/Ri" <O. This reward
 scheme induces arbitrary demand R! (-1)(p)
 on subject i, and the experimentally con-
 trolled market demand becomes Q=
 Z-1 R' (-l)(p) independent of the U,.
 Similarly, let j-1, 2, . . ., m subject sel-
 lers be given cost functions Cj(qj), and re-
 ceive cash earnings pk= - kCjq) from
 selling qj units at prices pi, pi, . . ., pg . If
 utility is Vj(Mj), Vf >0, then max<. V}[pqj
 -Cj(qj)] implies a supply function qj=
 Cf (-1)(p). The experimentally controlled
 market supply is Q= Ejml Cf (-1)(p) in-
 dependent of the Vj. Such induced supply
 and demand become flows per period in
 experiments in which trading is conducted
 in a sequence of periods.
 Example 2: Let subject traders be given
 a table listing increasing concave currency
 receipts M(x,, x2) to be paid by the experi-
 menter for terminal stocks (xl, x2) of each
 of two abstract experimental commodities
 exchanged in an experimental general
 equilibrium market. Then subject i's un-
 known utility for currency Ui(M) induces
 the value Ui [M(xl, X2)] on terminal stocks
 (xl, x2). Consequently, the experimentally
 controlled indifference map given by the
 level contours of M(xl, X2) are induced up-
 on subject i independent of his particular
 Ui. That is, each subject's marginal rate
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 of substitution of x2 for xi is given by
 Ui' Mll U' M2= MlIM2, Uft >0. This al-
 lows the "Edgeworth Box" representation
 of general exchange equilibrium to be re-
 produced experimentally by inducing a
 given indifference map on each member of
 one group of subjects, and another indiffer-
 ence map on each of a second group of
 subjects. With given endowments of the
 abstract commodities for members of each
 of the two trading groups, the experi-
 mental stage is set for exchange.
 II. Some Qualifications
 There are three important qualifications
 to the nonsatiation postulate:
 1. There may be subjective costs (or
 values) associated with market decisions.
 In a competitive market experiment a sub-
 ject may find it arduous to monitor and
 make quotations, and to execute transac-
 tions. If such considerations are not neg-
 ligible, then we lose some control over the
 process of induced valuation. The effect of
 boredom and the subjective costs of deci-
 sion making have been emphasized in the
 important study by Sidney Siegel (1961).
 Roger Sherman (1974) has interpreted al-
 leged violations of the Savage axioms in
 terms of the subjective cost of making the
 appropriate computations. In terms of the
 utility interpretation of the previous sec-
 tion, the utility function can now be writ-
 ten UP(Mi, Ei) where Ei is the "transac-
 tional effort" required to obtain reward Mi
 (cf. Harvey Leibenstein 1969; and im-
 plicitly, Ronald Coase 1960). To see the
 potential implications of costly choice,
 consider example 1 of the previous section
 in which demand Ri' (-1) (p) is induced upon
 i. Utility is now U{Ri[qi(Ei)J-pqi(Ei),
 Ei } where it is assumed crudely that "bar-
 gaining effort," Ei, results in the purchase
 quantity qi(Ei). Then maxE, Ui implies
 (Ri'-p) q/ U'+U2=0, and now the in-
 duced demand is qi-= R! (-')(p-U Ul 2Uq)
 <R (-l)(p), if U <0, q!' >0. Hence, if
 there is a cost (value) to transacting in the
 experimental task, the induced demand
 will be smaller (larger).
 There are several ways of dealing with
 this problem:
 (a) One is to examine the experimental
 results to see if the quantity exchanged is
 less than predicted. If it is, this is con-
 sistent with a significant transactions cost.
 Awareness of such transactions cost may
 provide valuable clues to understanding
 why certain experiments may fail to pro-
 duce predicted results. The process is not
 tautological as long as one can redesign the
 experiment and show that such conjectured
 transactional eff ects can be reduced.
 (b) Another approach is to use a reward
 structure to compensate for, or offset, the
 subjective costs of transacting. There are
 two ways of doing this. (i) One way (Siegel
 1961) is to simply raise the reward level.
 This increases the subjective value relative
 to the subjective cost of acquiring units
 qi. Let a be a scale parameter determin-
 ing reward level. Then utility becomes
 Ui a(Ri [q(Ei) ]-pqi(Ei)), Ei }. Induced
 demand is now qi = RI' (-1) (p_ p-U2/Uqia)
 ->R (-l)(p) in the limit as a increases pro-
 vided that the marginal rate of substitu-
 tion - UI/Ulqi'a decreases with the re-
 ward level. (ii) Alternatively, and this is
 the device used most extensively, subjects
 are promised a "commission," i, for each
 transaction in addition to their cash trad-
 ing profits. Now utility is Ui { Ri [qi(Ei) ]
 - (p-d3)qi(Ei), Ei }, and induced demand
 is
 qi = Ri (-U2/ 1 )
 (-1)p) if :3? - Ul/U,q, > 0.
 Compare two experiments (Charles Plott
 and Smith 1975, pp. 20-21) in which the
 induced supply and demand conditions
 were identical but one paid no cash trading
 commission, only trading profit, while the
 other paid both: In the one experiment,
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 volume was below (17-18 units) the "theo-
 retical" equilibrium quantity (20 units) in
 all seven trading periods; in the second ex-
 periment, volume was below (19 units)
 equilibrium in only two of eight trading
 periods.
 2. Individuals may attach game value
 to experimental outcomes. A profit in
 "points," Ri(qi) - pqi, may have subjective
 value Si [Ri(q) - pqi ]. If Si is monotone in-
 creasing then such game utilities create no
 methodological problems since they rein-
 force rather than distort the effect of an
 explicit monetary reward structure. Be-
 cause of such game utilities it is often pos-
 sible in simple-task experiments to get
 satisfactory results without monetary re-
 wards by using instructions to induce value
 by role-playing behavior (i.e., "think of
 yourself as making a profit of such and
 such when . . . "). But such game values
 are likely to be weak, erratic, and easily
 dominated by transactions costs, and sub-
 jects may be readily satiated with "point"
 profits.
 Qualifications 1 and 2 are illustrated in
 the convergence behavior of three experi-
 mental markets with no cash rewards and
 seven markets with complete and with
 random cash rewards. In the first three
 cases subjects were asked to imagine that
 trading profits and commissions were real.
 In each case the market was organized as a
 continuous double auction. (Buyers could
 make oral bids and sellers oral offers for a
 single unit, and any seller could accept a
 bid, any buyer an offer. Each subject
 knew only his own demand or supply con-
 ditions.) (See Smith 1964, pp. 199-201 for
 the instructions.) In the first case (Smith
 1962, p. 118, Chart 3) subjects trade only
 one unit per trading period. The absence
 of cash rewards does not hinder conver-
 gence to prices near equilibrium by the
 third trading period. However, deviations
 increase in period 4. In the absence of cash
 rewards this is more likely to occur as
 gaming boredom follows an initial (pleas-
 ant) experience of learning.
 In a second experiment (previously un-
 published) buyers received multiunit reve-
 nue (or resale value) schedules, and sellers
 multiunit total cost schedules. There were
 three buyers with one schedule, eight with
 another; four sellers with one cost schedule,
 eight with another. Now the task is more
 difficult and incentives are weak. Price
 convergence is strong, especially in the
 second period, since the greater volume
 when traders are given multiple-unit ca-
 pacities increases the learning experience
 within a trading period. But volume is
 considerably below (24 and 26 units in the
 first and second periods) the competitive
 prediction (30 units). This is consistent
 with the above theory where the task is
 more difficult (higher transactions cost)
 and monetary rewards are absent.
 Case 3 (Smith 1962, p. 119, Chart 4)
 illustrates an experiment which fails to
 reach either the competitive price or quan-
 tity although the market stabilizes nicely.
 In this case equilibrium requires contract
 prices to fall to the common limit price of
 all sellers. They are to "imagine" them-
 selves as making a 5-cent commission on
 TABLE 1-MEAN CONTRACT PRICE BY TRADING PERIOD
 Experiment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
 Excess Supply 5 5 5 5 8 8 8
 Reward Condition Complete Complete Random Complete Complete Complete Complete
 Information Condition Incomplete Incomplete Incomplete Complete Incomplete Incomplete Complete
 Trading Period 1 3.48 3.67 3.60 3.51 3.26 3.49 3.56
 Trading Period 2 3.29 3.26 3.44 3.40 3.15 3.28 3.25
 Trading Period 3 3.19 3.12 3.31 3.34 3.11 3.13 3.20
 Trading Period 4 3.14 3.10 3.24 3.37 3.10 3.12 3.17
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 trades at these limit prices, but clearly this
 is not real enough to induce many con-
 tracts at $3.10 (the theoretical equilib-
 rium). Not even a decrease in demand suc-
 ceeded in lowering contracts to $3.10
 (Table 1). This contrasts with several ex-
 periments (1, 2, 5, 6 in Table 1) using com-
 plete cash rewards in which the supply and
 demand are even more asymmetric than in
 case 3. In Table 1, markets with an excess
 supply of five (eight) consisted of eleven
 buyers with limit prices $4.20 and sixteen
 (nineteen) sellers with limit prices $3.10. A
 different subject group participated in each
 double auction experiment. Convergence
 to the competitive price and quantity by
 trading period 4 was strong, although at
 the equilibrium price each buyer receives
 $1.15 profit with commission per trade
 while each seller receives only the 5-cent
 commission.
 A controlled measurement of the effect
 of complete versus random monetary re-
 wards is shown in Table 1, experiments
 1--3. In 1 and 2 all subjects were paid their
 trading profit plus commission in cash,
 while in 3 four of the 27 subjects were
 chosen at random to receive cash profits at
 the end of each trading period. The weaker
 random reward structure significantly re-
 tards the market's convergence.
 Qualifications 1 and 2 lead to a precau-
 tionary corollary: with or without mone-
 tary rewards, the experimenter may be
 tempted to add "realism" by giving the
 abstract experimental commodity a name
 such as "wheat," or otherwise attempt to
 use instructions to simulate the alleged
 circumstances of a particular market. This
 runs the danger of so enriching induced
 values that control over valuation is lost.
 Suppose, as above, that a subject is paid
 Ri(qi)-pqi, but also perceives that he
 must attach instruction-induced value to
 qi. Utility may now be Ui[Ri(qi)-pqi, qi],
 and demand becomes qi= R- (-1)(p-U UlU,)
 > R '(1) (p). Consequently, it may be pref-
 erable not to embellish the instructions
 with well-intentioned attempts at "realism."
 Let the explicit reward structure be the
 singular source of valuation, insofar as this
 is possible.
 3. Individuals may not be autonomous
 own-reward maximizers. Interpersonal util-
 ity criteria may qualify the theory of in-
 duced valuation. Thus subject i's utility
 may depend upon both i's and k's reward,
 Ui [Ri(qi)-pqi, Rk(qk)-pqk ] . If this condi-
 tion prevails, then the demand of i may
 depend upon that of k. However, this kind
 of interdependence is effectively controlled
 by the experimental condition of "incom-
 plete" informatioln, first defined and
 studied by Lawrence Fouraker and Siegel
 (1960, 1963) in experimental studies of bi-
 lateral bargaining and oligopoly. Under in-
 complete information subjects only know
 their own payoff contingencies. With Rk(qk)
 unknown to i, it cannot appear as a subjec-
 tive argument of Ui.
 The effect when subjects have complete
 information on each other's payoff con-
 tingencies is seen (Table 1) by comparing
 1 (5) and 2 (6) with 4 (7). In 1 (5) and 2 (6)
 each subject knew only his own limit price.
 In 4 (7) the only change in the instructions
 was to add the information that there were
 eleven buyers, each with a $4.20 resale
 value, and sixteen (nineteen in 7) sellers,
 each with unit cost $3.10. From the mean
 price series it is seen that "complete" in-
 formation of this kind retards the equilib-
 rium tendencies of the double auction.
 Mean prices, especially in periods 3 and 4,
 tended to be higher under complete in-
 formation than under incomplete informa-
 tion. The explanation is that with in-
 formation on each other's payoffs, the way
 is open for "equity" considerations to
 modify self-interest choices. Sellers, believ-
 ing that it is "fair" for trading profits to be
 shared between buyers and sellers, try to
 resist price decreases more vigorously than
 when they do not know what constitutes
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 such a fair price. Buyers acquiesce in this
 sharing by accepting many contracts well
 above $3.10, but since there is an excess of
 sellers, those holding out for the higher
 prices are the sellers most likely to fail to
 make contracts. Consequently, contract
 prices tend to decline, if slowly, when ex-
 cess supply is 5, but more rapidly when ex-
 cess supply is 8. The tendency of prices to
 be higher under complete information is
 contrary to the view of those who have
 argued that "perfect" information is es-
 sential for establishing competitive prices.
 The results are consistent with the game-
 theoretic proposition that more informa-
 tion increases the prospect of collusion
 (Shubik 1959, p. 171), and with the results
 of Fouraker and Siegel (1963, p. 187) in
 which the tendency of the competitive
 equilibrium to prevail under duopoly bar-
 gaining is reduced under complete infor-
 mation.
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